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Introduction 
This chapter discusses my documentary film practice, which explores the filmic mediation 
of subjectivity through the materiality of the pro-filmic event and the materiality of the film 
text. One of the major challenges for documentary filmmakers lies in the identification and 
mediation of subjective experiences and their expository degree of traits unique to the person 
being filmed. But, how can a spatio-temporally highly localized, first-person phenomenon like 
‘subjectivity’ be turned into a ‘collective’ subjectivity that is experienced by an audience?  
Searle (1992, p. 97) asserts that subjectivity per se cannot be observed in the physical 
world, but it can be mapped through the interaction between our body, our behavior and the 
immediate environment. Searle also argues that “where conscious subjectivity is concerned, 
there is no distinction between the observation and the thing observed, between the perception 
and the object perceived” (1992, p. 97). Therefore, the synergy between perception and the 
material world represents the major premise of my proposed methodology, which attempts to 
explore two sets of symbiotic relationships in the pursuit of mediating subjectivity: the 
relationship between film characters and their physical environment, and the relationship 
between spectator and film text. I will first distinguish between these two relationships by 
proposing a two-level approach to my film practice where both levels can be understood through 
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the study of materiality as an agency for not just perceiving, but experiencing the world, which 
constitutes a major paradigm in phenomenological thought (see Heidegger, 1962; Merleau-
Ponty, 1962). The first level relates to the filmmaker’s encounter with the subject, for which I 
will propose anthropological methods that facilitate the identification and filming of subjective 
experiences manifested through objects and spaces. These methods will be based on 
phenomenological traditions adapted to ethnographic inquiry. The second level relates to the 
audience’s experience by means of the film form, for which I will suggest methods based on 
cognitive film theory.  
Phenomenology and cognitive theory may appear incongruent, the former describing 
subjective, first-person point-of-views, and the latter formulating objective, third-person 
methodologies (Marbach, 2007, p. 385). However, I aim to demonstrate that the addition of 
cognitive models to a phenomenological approach is beneficial to documentary practice in order 
to facilitate the mediation, in particular the reception of subjectivity. David Bordwell stresses the 
value of cognitive models for addressing a variety of levels of audience reception: “Cognitive 
theory wants to understand such human mental activities as recognition, comprehension, 
inference-making, interpretation, judgment, memory, and imagination” (1989, p. 12). Also, 
similar to phenomenological tradition, cognitive theory postulates that film viewing is an 
‘intentional act’, where perception and cognition are directed at ‘something’ in the outside world. 
This ‘something’ constitutes film form – the materiality of the film text. 
My case study will aim to validate this cognitive-phenomenological approach by referring 
to a scene from my current documentary project that explores the cinematic portrayal of 
blindness and subjectivity. My research constitutes in what Haseman (2006, p. 4) calls 
‘performative research’. Drawing on J. L. Austin’s ‘performativity’ in speech act theory, he 
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posits that as an alternative to quantitative (numeric) and qualitative (verbal) data, performative 
data represents non-numeric and non-verbal forms that make up the research practice itself, such 
as moving images (2006, p. 6). This type of research is strictly practice-led, in that practitioners 
commence practicing and see what emerges, thus omitting ‘the constraints of narrow problem 
setting and rigid methodological requirements at the outset of a project’ (2006, p. 4). Thus, the 
methodology presented here has largely emerged from the interaction between me and my 
documentary subjects, observing their behavior, reactions and attitudes within their domestic 
spaces, and focusing on their interaction with material elements (objects and places). As a result, 
my methodology is grounded and encourages a flexible bricolage approach where cross-
disciplinary methods are adopted, tweaked and merged in order to suit emerging empirical data.   
 
Materiality and a two-level approach to film practice 
The concept of ‘materiality’ offers a good starting point for identifying, capturing and 
conveying physical manifestations of subjectivity. I adopt the term “materiality” as used in 
material culture studies, which according to Hicks (2010, p. 25), has emerged during the 
twentieth century as a major discipline within archeology and socio-cultural anthropology. 
According to archeologist Christopher Tilley, “Materiality refers to the fleshy, corporeal and 
physical, as opposed to spiritual, ideal and value-laden aspects of human existence” (2006, p. 3). 
Thus, materiality can include any thing as diverse as tools, decorative objects, buildings, food, 
plants etc. For Woodward it is only through material engagements that individuals have the 
opportunity to articulate aspects of identity (2007, p. 135). Objects have the potential to “carry 
personal, cultural and emotional meanings, related to subjective identity – they can facilitate 
interpersonal interaction, and help a person to act upon him or herself.” Accordingly, in a 
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filmmaking context subjective experience takes on material form that is empirically palpable to 
the filmmaker and consequently mediatable through film. However, materiality can also be 
understood as the virtual physicality of film form, which is essentially the audio-visual 
juxtaposition of filmic elements that are empirically palpable to the spectator. Thus, as there are 
two sets of materialities, there are two sets of subjectivities, as Chateau confirms: The referred to 
or pro-filmic subjectivity, as observed by the filmmaker during the encounter with the subject, 
and the depicted subjectivity, as experienced by the audience through formal choices in the film 
text (2011, p. 12).  
This distinction reveals two phenomenological instances of experiencing Searle’s 
externalized subjectivity: Firstly, the pro-filmic embodiment of the character’s subjectivity 
through objects and spaces, and secondly, the resulting filmmaker’s embodied experience 
manifested in film form and ultimately experienced by the spectator. But, in real life these levels 
overlap, rendering the distinction purely conceptual. For instance, as soon as the camera starts 
recording the encounter, formal decisions are made about framing, shot size, camera movement 
and editing. Nevertheless, with regards to mediating subjectivity, I argue that these two levels 
require different, though interdependent methods. Hence, the distinction should not be seen as a 
separation in the structuralist-semiotic tradition.  
 
The materiality of the encounter 
Given the inductive nature of practice-led research, instead of proposing a fixed set of 
methods, I present two prerequisites in form of two anthropological theories of materiality, the 
‘biographical object’ and ‘objectification’. These concepts are malleable enough to frame a 
variety of methods in accordance to specific case studies encountered in the field. In addition, 
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they share a phenomenological paradigm in that they focus on first-person subjective experiences 
in relation to objects and space.  
The ‘biographical object’ is an object that mediates a localized, particular and individual 
identity through human interaction (Morin in Hoskins, 1998, p. 8). She discerns three levels of 
mediation: (1) at the temporal level the object becomes old and worn, (2) at the spatial level it 
anchors the owner to a particular space and time, and (3) at the owner’s level the object is 
formative of the user’s identity and narrative process of self-definition. This dialectical 
relationship between subject and object is also established through the theory of objectification 
(Miller, 2010; Tilley, 2006). Tilley explains the ambiguous relationship between subject and 
object as being “same and different, constituted and constituting” (2006, p. 61). They form part 
of each other, while not collapsing into or being subsumed into the other. Hence, objects can be 
regarded as embodiments of subjects, and the interaction with objects constitutes the 
embodiment of subjective experience. Low calls this phenomenon of experience-oriented space 
“embodied space”. “Embodied space is the location where human experience and consciousness 
take on material and spatial form” (Low, 2003, p. 10). These anthropological concepts prove 
particularly useful for organizing the mise-en-scene of the encounter. For example, subjects may 
be asked to interact with biographical objects or be interviewed within personal spaces in order 
to elicit embodied experiences on their part. Simultaneously, formal decisions (cinematographic 
and editorial) have to be made in order to capture and mediate these experiences, for which I 
propose methods based on cognitive film theory. 
 
The materiality of film form 
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For Chateau “film … is clearly an objective object in the sense of being absolutely external 
to any mind; above all, it is observable like any other physical thing” (2011, p. 165). He also 
emphasizes that film form is the quasi corporeal manifestation of subjectivity through specific 
signs, which he calls the “objectivation of subjectivity,” and the process of mediation entails the 
audience’s interplay with that form (a.a. 12). Chateau therefore assumes an audio-visual 
codification of pro-filmic subjectivity into film form, which requires an objective set of codes, or 
common language that determines a wider audience’s understanding and experience of the 
subjectivity portrayed. Thus, ‘objectivization’ is an intrinsic part of Chateau’s ‘objectivation’. 
The objectivization of subjective experience is explored in empirical studies based on 
phenomenological approaches. 
According to Gallagher and Zahavi, Husserl’s phenomenology is initially a philosophical 
venture, not an empirical discipline (2008, p. 29). Thus, Husserl’s transcendental methods of 
analyzing first-person subjectivity are incompatible with objectivizing methodologies from 
natural sciences (a.a. 28-29). However, Gallagher and Zahavi describe a new approach, 
“naturalized phenomenology”, that acknowledges subjective phenomena as being part of nature 
and as a result, open to empirical analysis (a.a. 30). For the task of naturalization Marbach 
proposes that the empirical results of phenomenological observations need to be embedded in 
formalized descriptions that bear intersubjectively shareable meanings, which requires a 
formalized language that expresses not the content of experience, but its formal structure (in 
Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008, p. 30). Therefore, naturalizing phenomenology has two major 
advantages: firstly, the evaluation of highly subjectivized phenomenological data results in an 
objectivized form of notation that is accessible to other researchers, and secondly, 
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phenomenological research designs can be reproduced in different contexts with different 
subjects.  
Although these observations may seem only tangentially relevant to documentary 
filmmaking, they nonetheless highlight the very essence of the filmic mediation of subjectivity. 
Filmic mediation is an agent for conveying information and meaning through a particular code 
(Hayward, 1996, p. 213). In Marbach’s words, this code is a formalized language that carries 
intersubjectively shareable meanings, which conveys the expression of formal structures of 
subjectivity from an individual screen subject to a collective of subjects within the audience. In 
other words, subjectivity can only be mediated to an undetermined group of spectators if first-
person phenomena recorded during the real-life encounter are translated (naturalized) into a 
codified film form that elicits an equivalent subjective response in a group of viewers. This 
‘objectivization’ of subjectivity is inextricably connected to Chateau’s ‘objectivation’, and their 
synergistic relationship enables an anticipated interplay between pro-filmic materiality, the 
materiality of film form and the audience’s experience thereof. Cognitive film models prove 
valuable for not just the analysis of film form, but the very conceptualization of it during the 
filmmaking process. 
Cognitive film theory is rooted in cognitive psychology and offers arguably the most 
adequate approach to the process of naturalizing and objectivizing phenomenological data. For 
Currie film cognitivism is a methodological framework, rather than a prescriptive set of methods 
(2004, p. 106). Hence, film cognitivists are suspicious of “system-building, opting instead for an 
eclectic mix of theories and models determined by the purpose in hand”. Cognitivists attempt to 
avoid ‘perceived totalizations, miscalculations, and obscurities’ as exemplified in other film 
theories (Rushton and Bettinson, 2010, p. 160). Thus, cognitive theorizing is often speculative 
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and diffident, formulating scientifically plausible, but at the same time flexible and corrigible 
arguments. In this capacity, cognitive film theory seems an appropriate choice for the grounded 
bricolage approach my practice requires.  
Henry Breitrose is a strong proponent for the use of cognitive film theory in documentary 
practice, arguing that a pragmatic film theory should provide the documentary filmmaker with 
some confidence in the process, as well as helping him/her craft a work that “succeeds in 
engaging the audience” (2012, p. 5). Speaking as a pedagogue, Breitrose means by ‘confidence’ 
an intuitive determination with regards to aesthetic choices tailored to the situation or purpose at 
hand, rather than a pre-conceived or normative approach. Teaching documentary practice myself, 
I can confirm that students, as well as experienced practitioners, are constantly faced with the 
need for spontaneous decisions about the choice of locations, actuality and filming styles. 
Cognitive film theory proves very efficient in these situations, as it directly relates a variety of 
possible audience experiences to choices in mise-en-scene, cinematography and editing.  
 
The material methodology in practice 
Focusing on a real-life example, the proposed methodology was conceived and refined as a 
result of my encounters with two blind subjects during my documentary project on blindness and 
subjectivity. The subjects rely on materiality in relation to their bodies (e.g. through touch, smell 
and echolocation) to not only get by in everyday life but to establish a sense of identity and 
compensating for the lack of seeing their body and their spatial surroundings. My initial 
observation of their tendency to speak through or about objects, directed me towards material 
culture studies. However, this alone proved insufficient when it came to considering filmic 
mediation and how an audience could experience (not just witness) embodied subjectivity, for 
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which my choice fell on cognitive film theory. This would allow me to reverse the process of 
film analysis (as originally intended by cognitive film theorists) to a process of film synthesis 
that informs the actual production process (as suggested by Breitrose). With reference to the 
conception of a particular scene from the film, I will first describe the methods used in relation to 
the pro-filmic encounter, and then the methods used in relation to film form.     
 
 
 
Terry and his Brush – Pro-filmic Encounter 
 
 
Figure 1: Terry and his brush 
 
I asked Terry, a blind painter, to choose an object that is very dear to him and talk about it 
in front of the camera (Figure 1)1. I did not direct him about what to say or what to do with the 
object. Terry chose an old paint brush that he kept referring to as an ‘old mate’. One of the most 
interesting aspects of this scene is how the encounter between the filmmaker, subject and object 
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contributes to the eduction of Terry’s subjective experience and the revelation of the brush’s 
material mediation capacities through Morin’s three levels (spatial, temporal, identificational). 
This performative interaction is triggered by Terry being situated in two ontological modes, for 
which materiality is constitutive (Richardson, 1982, p. 421). Drawing on Heidegger’s being-in-
the-world, Richardson explains that in one mode we experience the world around us as a given 
fact, being absorbed in responding to others and subconsciously focusing on the task at hand. In 
the other mode we are detached from the tasks at hand and self-conscious in our responses to 
others – we experience the world as a construct. Objects and spaces determine which mode we 
adopt, resulting in a concrete material situatedness. Richardson points out that our “ability to 
shift modes of being poses critical questions about the relationship between our existence and the 
world in which we exist”.   
In the brush scene Terry oscillates between these two modes because the scene is 
essentially a hybrid between an interview (Terry talking to and for the camera) and actuality 
(Terry performing or recreating actual events). Thus, these two contrasting modes of situatedness 
result in Terry experiencing the brush at times self-consciously, and at times immersively. 
Initially, Terry is self-conscious of the situation and the object as he presents it to the camera, 
touching it reflectively and making occasional pauses in order to organize his thoughts. He 
highlights different attributes and functions of the brush, some of which appear to shift into his 
reflective consciousness for the first time. For instance, when he demonstrates how he puts his 
brush behind his ear during painting, he reflects over his action by warning himself that he 
should not poke his eye (Figure 2). This reveals Morin’s spatial level of the biographical object, 
as the brush is spatially anchored to a particular part of Terry’s body, and his actions have to be 
limited and carefully orchestrated in order not to anchor it to an undesired part. Also, Terry chose 
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to be interviewed in his bedroom where he usually paints, so, the brush is not only anchored to a 
particular place, but also to a particular situation - it is only when Terry uses the brush that the 
bedroom becomes his studio. 
 
 
Figure 2: Commenting on not poking his eye 
 
He also verbally points out that the brush is worn out, whilst inadvertently plucking the 
loose head off the handle and scratching through the thick layers of paint that have engulfed the 
brush’s handle over the years. These actions reveal Morin’s temporal level of the biographical 
object becoming old and worn, showing its patina of age. Furthermore, whilst reflecting over the 
brush’s age, Terry becomes at times absorbed in his actions (e.g. the scratching), seemingly 
talking to himself. Yet when these actions become reflexive, he talks again to the camera. The 
same fluctuation happens when he re-enacts different painting maneuvers (Figure 3).  
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 Figure 3: Re-enacting painting maneuvres 
 
Terry and his Brush – Film Form 
 
In terms of spectatorship, my objective during filming and editing this scene was to make 
the audience closely experience Terry’s character and subjectivity through body movement, 
space and objects. Therefore, I used film cognitivist Murray Smith’s character sympathy model. 
Smith (1994) establishes three levels of character sympathy: recognition, alignment and 
allegiance. Recognition is dependent on the visual representation of the human face and body 
(a.a. 36). Alignment describes the spectator’s access to the character’s space and subjectivity 
(a.a. 41). Allegiance refers to the moral and ideological evaluation of the screen character. As 
allegiance has to be discussed on a narrative level, it will not be elaborated here.  
Regarding recognition and spatial alignment, I filmed Terry mostly in medium shots, as 
they allowed the inclusion of his face, his upper body and the brush in the same frame, 
reinforcing the notion of embodied space through close visual proximity. I deliberately avoided 
separating Terry and the brush through too many insert shots, which would have resulted in a 
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montage of close-ups that deconstruct the space. This is often done in documentaries about 
blindness in a somewhat naïve pursuit to engage the audience in a tactile experience, whilst 
unintentionally obscuring body language and the coherence of space. The medium shot has an 
additional advantage of showing hands and arms gestures. Especially in conjunction with 
handling objects, these gestures are intimately connected with verbal communication and 
externalize emotions, as well as unarticulated thoughts (Beatty, 2003, p. 1). 
However, considering the dialectic concept of objectification, the brush had to be treated in 
a “subjective” manner, too. In terms of the recognition of and alignment with objects, Carroll and 
Seeley (2013, pp. 59-60) define Schyn’s diagnostic recognition features as  “sets of sensory 
features sufficient to enable an organism to perceptually recognize the identity, shape, location, 
and affordances of objects and events in the environment”. Diagnosticity is task specific and the 
perspective we approach and view the object from depends on the task or goal for which the 
object is used. 
The diagnosticity in Terry’s scene manifests through a plethora of different angles and 
sizes of the brush, highlighting different affordances and situating the brush in different modes of 
‘being’ – utilitarian, possessive, emotive, autobiographical. There are a few close-ups that show 
Terry’s fingers interacting with the brush, such as when he starts scratching into the paint layers 
and when the head comes off (Figures 4 and 5). These close-ups were necessary to reveal 
specific parts of the brush that linked to Terry’s action. I deliberately tried to avoid close-ups of 
the brush without Terry performing a task that would motivate diagnostic proximity. 
Interestingly, unlike the other blind character where I had to move the camera in order to capture 
different angles and sizes of the object handled, Terry’s expressive upper body gesticulations 
meant that the camera could be mostly static, and still capture multiple perspectives of the brush. 
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Figure 4: Scratching into paint layers. 
 
Figure 5: Brush head coming off. 
 
In terms of subjective alignment the brush scene takes place in a particular space, the 
bedroom, where Terry would naturally interact with the brush, and towards which Terry has 
certain feelings. The bedroom is small and congested, which Terry had previously complained 
about on several occasions. I have tried to mediate Terry’s subjective experience of his bedroom 
by not having any extreme wide shots that reveal the entire room, but only shots where Terry’s 
body (or parts of it) fills the frame. In addition, the camera remains in the same position 
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throughout the scene so that all shots reveal only one perspective of the event. As a result, the 
audience’s sense of space is very limited. No total orientation is possible and the space is 
experienced as tight and claustrophobic. This sensation is heightened by the continuity style that 
simulates real-time, immersing the spectator into a diegetic chronotope. There are no cutaways to 
other spaces, no non-diegetic sounds or music, and no voice-over. For the entire scene the 
experience of space and time is restricted to this small part of the bedroom.   
In summary, one can see the inextricable connection, yet conceptual separation, between 
methods used during the encounter and methods used to conceive film form. This two-level 
approach does not only offer a useful and reliable tool for practitioners, but also an academically 
rigorous methodology for predicting a possible mediation process, thus formulating a plausible 
audience response. Thus, the methodological conclusions from my case study can be 
extrapolated in film production, as well as film analysis contexts. But, especially in terms of 
audience reception, it is paramount to stress that the mediation process I describe for Terry’s 
scene is only a possible outcome. As the filmmaker, this is naturally my preferred outcome. This 
does not mean that I disregard alternative audience experiences and polysemic readings of Terry 
describing his brush. Unfortunately, the scope of this chapter does neither allow for other 
possible spectatorship scenarios, nor for an expanded discourse arguing that the process of 
naturalization in a film mediation context is not necessarily normative or positivist, assuming a 
single, idealized viewing response. This is a common objection to cognitive film theory which 
has been thoroughly contested by cognitivists, such as Peterson (1996) and Nannicelli and 
Taberham (2014). Nannicelli and Taberham locate the major (film) cognitivist paradigm as one 
of rational inquiry: What unites cognitivists is striving for a rigorous approach or theorizing, 
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rather than the theory itself (2014, p. 7). From this perspective, it can be argued that my proposed 
methodology is itself ‘only’ a case study.  
Consequently, my aim has been to present one theoretical approach to documentary 
filmmaking and practice-based research. I have formulated an interdisciplinary and pragmatic 
methodology for enabling the filmic mediation of subjectivity, which has emerged from my 
documentary practice, and I do not claim that objects and spaces are the only vehicles for 
conveying subjective experience per se. As my practice is semi-ethnographic, I have identified 
materiality (in the anthropological tradition) as a possibility to map subjectivity through 
embodied space when subjects perform or reflect on quotidian activities and objects. Hence, 
focusing on materiality is not only relevant to blind people, but also to other research contexts 
that deal with observing and filming people’s everyday lives. However, I have not touched on 
other documentary film elements, such as the interview or voice-over, which entail alternative 
forms for mediating subjectivity (e.g. disembodied subjectivity). Other stylistic forms, such as 
animation and archive, open up even further layers of subjectivity with regards to authorship and 
the materiality of the film image itself, in which case concepts of reflexivity, authorship and the 
film-as-artifact require exploration. 
This chapter has mainly focused on subjectivity through spatial experience from a 
cognitive-phenomenological perspective. Emotions, which are widely analyzed in cognitive film 
theory, have not been considered. Neither has the hermeneutic level of audience reception where 
narrative comprehension and interpretation can become vehicles for subjectivity when linked to 
themes and motifs, which is further complicated through polysemic audience readings. In order 
to account for these different types of audience reception I hope the discourse presented here 
encourages longer film studies to make more use of the cross-disciplinarity of contemporary 
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cognitive film theory, referring to fields, such as semiotics, iconography, aesthetics, 
neuropsychology and cultural studies. I further hope that it will stimulate documentary 
practitioners to embrace theoretical models, especially if they prove pragmatic for specific case 
studies. This should be accompanied by the understanding that film’s primary purpose is that of 
mediation, and mediation can only be achieved if it is understood as an interaction between the 
author, the subject, the film text and the spectator. Grasping the linking processes between these 
entities should be the main concern of film practitioners, scholars and educators.  
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